The Reality Behind a “U.S. Invasion” War-Planning Story That Landed Amid Heated Arctic Defence Negotiations as Carney Went to Davos

OpEd: Treating Trump’s provocations as literal invasion warnings risks turning transient political noise into bad policy.

Google Search page images of recent Globe and Mail reporting on U.S. invasion scenarios.

By Ian Bradbury

OTTAWA — Recent headlines have sensationalised reports that the Canadian Armed Forces modelled hypothetical U.S. invasion scenarios, framing them as evidence of deteriorating alliances or impending conflict. This narrative not only fuels unnecessary alarm, but misrepresents how serious militaries operate.

Having worked on modelling and contingency planning for highly improbable scenarios in both government and the private sector, I believe it is important for readers to understand the broader context behind scenarios that appeared on the front page of Canada’s “newspaper of record,” The Globe and Mail, on January 20.

This is especially true, because the story was published amid intense debate over Arctic defence—and on the same day Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered a high-consequence speech in Davos, Switzerland, and just one day before the NATO Secretary General and allied defence leaders addressed that same forum with pointed, on-topic messages.

It is equally important to assert that, for some Canadian security experts, it is very clear that President Trump’s provocations about Canada becoming the “51st state” are part of well-established political bluster aimed at forcing rapid and meaningful territorial defence capability development among NATO countries he views as laggards, not serious invasion threats.

This fact has been openly recognised by the Secretary General of NATO. Canadians treating them as genuine threats of invasion is a mistake and risks turning transient political noise into misguided policy and narrative responses, as we have already witnessed in recent weeks.

Now, turning to Canadian military contingency planning.

Modelling worst-case scenarios is a core element of military planning, not a signal of distrust. Responsible militaries, including the United States, routinely wargame contingencies with allies to test readiness, identify vulnerabilities, and inform future force development. Over the course of my own defence and security work, this focus has consistently included very low-probability, very high-consequence scenarios, precisely because the cost of being unprepared would be catastrophic. This is not alarmism, but prudent and established practice.

Canada’s recent exercise continues a long-standing tradition of strategic planning dating back to Defence Scheme No. 1 in the 1920s, regularly updated to reflect contemporary global challenges. These include Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and expanding grey-zone activities, China’s growing Silk Road ambitions and increasingly adversarial behaviour, and shifting and hardening U.S. policy under President Trump. The reason is straightforward: failing to prepare effectively for such scenarios weakens collective preparedness and strategic positioning, rather than strengthens stability and sovereignty.

The true story here is not one of the U.S. invading Canada, but of prudence in rapidly strengthening Canadian territorial defence and dominance.

Credible alliances are not sustained through passive goodwill or wishful thinking. They are maintained through sustained commitment, tough decisions, interoperable capabilities, and shared operational risk in the face of real and persistent threats. When strains emerge in long-standing partnerships from transient political noise or differing communications strategies, true allies do not retreat or overreact. They assess and acknowledge where friction stems from, safeguard shared interests, double down on diplomacy and meaningful cooperation to achieve mutual goals, and stand united against common adversaries and threats.

In this moment, instead of amplifying division with our most important ally, serious Canadian leaders should channel this into a focus on what truly strengthens territorial defence and North American security: deliberate, capability-driven cooperation with the United States and reinforcement of the strategic partnership.

Said differently, at this juncture, the security of Canada, North America, and NATO depends on both Canada and the United States being independently strong, capable, united, and reliable on the defence and security front. This position is not subservience to the United States; it is establishing practical territorial defence and stepping up to meet commitments to Canadians and allies alike.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb aptly captured this reality at the World Economic Forum’s “Can Europe Defend Itself?” session, noting, “You fight wars on the battlefield, but you win them at home.”

He emphasised the importance of domestic resilience, civilian preparedness, and comprehensive security strategies in sustaining territorial defence efforts.

Stubb also reminded the audience, “It’s all good and well to talk about [military spending] percentages, but just remember: you don’t fight wars with percentages, you fight wars with capabilities, and those you just need to have in stock.”

This insight is crucial for Canada and Canadians, who must focus not on announced spending targets or aspirational initiatives that sound good in speeches, but on taking the steps necessary to ensure that the Canadian defence apparatus is ready, capable, and sustainable amid increasing crisis risks, fully integrated, scalable, and interoperable to address evolving threats.

Canada already has a workable framework. Our North, Strong and Free outlines key priorities, but implementation has lagged behind the growing demands of a rapidly changing strategic environment.

Improvements are needed.

Transparent quarterly reporting, for instance, would enforce discipline in delivering critical capabilities, particularly in space-enabled operations, data-driven effects, and Arctic sovereignty, domains where China is increasingly active and expanding its dual-use presence.

Procurement reform is equally urgent. Granting CAF leadership the authority to bypass bureaucratic obstacles would enable faster delivery of urgently needed brigade- and unit-level capabilities such as drones, sensors, weapon systems, operational equipment, and cyber tools, while remaining closely aligned with U.S. standards and NATO and NORAD commitments.

Ongoing investment in NORAD modernization remains essential to Canadian territorial defence and to addressing political pressures from the south. This includes upgrades to over-the-horizon radars, space domain awareness systems, and advanced hypersonic missile detection and intercept capabilities.

These initiatives are vital for preparedness and for responding to active and emerging threats, reflecting a broader shift toward integrated and dynamic continental defence in a rapidly evolving risk environment. These threats are not distant—they are present now, making a prudent and proactive approach essential.

Canada has additional viable options to strengthen territorial defence.

These include expanding domestic and expeditionary surge capacities, for which I have direct knowledge of workable concepts that are either already circulating in Parliament or close to it; enhanced participation in the U.S.-led “Golden Dome” missile defence system integrated through NORAD’s binational command, which is critical to U.S. interests; and significant expansion of domestic munitions production and stockpiling, which is essential for national resiliency. These are just a few examples of measures that could be implemented within a reasonably rapid timeframe.

Prioritising enhanced capabilities in cyberspace, space, and economic resilience would further strengthen Canada’s contribution to North America’s layered defences. Combined, these steps would integrate Canada more fully into modern missile defence systems, better counter threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and aerial systems posed by Russia and China, significantly strengthen Canadian defence posture, and improve the fairness of the North American defence burden shared with the United States.

Expanded domestic munitions production would not only strengthen Canada’s defence posture, it would also deliver economic benefits across the country by creating new skilled jobs and ensuring a more resilient, NATO-standard ammunition supply chain.

Canada can also capitalise on advanced aviation capabilities with the U.S. Army’s upcoming fielding of the MV-75 tiltrotor, which offers double the range, speed, and payload of the aging UH-60 Black Hawk. Adoption of this platform could significantly extend the CAF’s operational reach for Arctic patrols, disaster response, and expeditionary operations, while reinforcing Canada’s commitment to U.S. burden-sharing expectations amid rising great-power competition.

A short-term bridging option, such as leasing Black Hawks, could address immediate capability gaps while preserving readiness. This approach would allow Canada to prepare for joint production, sustainment, and technology-sharing, while ensuring seamless operational integration in the Arctic and beyond. Bell Textron’s established Canadian presence could further support this effort, contributing to North American aviation integration and industrial resilience.

The Canadian Coast Guard could also play a larger role in bolstering North American security, particularly in the Arctic, where geopolitical importance is increasingly recognised by both China and Russia. Designating select vessels for military status while retaining civilian mandates for others would improve joint maritime domain awareness and intelligence-sharing. Establishing a multinational training base on Baffin Island, co-managed with U.S. partners, could further strengthen Canada’s northern defences by creating a new NATO-compatible hub for cold-weather and Arctic operations.

All of this aligns with NATO’s emphasis on integrated, fair burden-sharing among allies. Canada must move decisively toward meeting the two-percent-of-GDP defence benchmark, not as a political concession, but as a necessary step toward credibility, operational relevance, and maintaining influence in an increasingly unstable world.

These investments are not aimed at countering the United States or preparing for Trump, but at tangibly strengthening the alliance and enhancing collective capacity to deter Russian and Chinese aggression, with NORAD modernization and increased territorial defence capabilities playing a central role in this evolving strategy.

Allowing distorted narratives, performative outrage, and reactive political posturing to shape defence policy is far more damaging than sensational headlines alone. When transient rhetoric, domestic signalling, or grievance-driven framing displaces sober assessment, it erodes strategic clarity and weakens the very capabilities meant to ensure security.

The emergence of a new round of “elbows up” rhetoric, complete with caricatures of armed seniors from the local curling club ready to head to borders or Greenland in defiance of Trump, illustrates how quickly symbolism can be mistaken for preparedness. What presents as resistance and resolve critically risks becoming a substitute for capability and seriousness.

The Canada-U.S. partnership endures not through sentiment, speeches, or performative unity, but through real cohesion, prioritization of shared interests, and sustained, credible territorial defence capability. Strong alliances can never be assumed; they are deliberately built, tested, nurtured, and maintained. Canada’s task in 2026 is not to posture or react, but to invest, integrate, and contribute meaningfully to continental defence. By focusing on real readiness, interoperable capabilities, and disciplined cooperation, Canada can manage friction constructively, deter adversaries, and strengthen North American security.

Sensible, solutions-oriented defence grounded in capability rather than narrative or partisanship must prevail.

Ian Bradbury, a global security specialist with over 25 years experience, transitioned from Defence and NatSec roles to found Terra Nova Strategic Management (2009) and 1NAEF (2014). A TEDx, UN, NATO, and Parliament speaker, he focuses on terrorism, hybrid warfare, conflict aid, stability operations, and geo-strategy.