Exclusive: Chinese Election Interference Network Tied to Senate Breach Investigation

As Canada’s election unfolds, fresh questions emerge over whether foreign interference has reached Parliament’s inner chambers.

OTTAWA — A Canadian Parliamentarian assessed by national security officials to be part of a Toronto-based Chinese consulate election interference network was the subject of a high-profile foreign interference investigation into an alleged breach of Canada’s Senate, The Bureau has confirmed through multiple intelligence sources.

Sources said the investigation examined allegations that the Parliamentarian enabled a close associate—described as a female Chinese national—to bypass Senate security protocols.

A source familiar with the Senate breach allegation said the probe was triggered by a complaint from a sitting Canadian senator, who believed they had observed a troubling pattern of behavior involving the Parliamentarian and their Chinese companion. The concern, the source said, centered on the alleged bypassing of Senate security screening, unauthorized entry into the parliamentary precinct, and access to secure Government of Canada computer systems.

While The Bureau could not independently confirm whether the allegations were ultimately substantiated, the details align closely with broader risks outlined in NSICOP’s 2024 findings on foreign interference, which stated that CSIS’s investigations were valid, and that China—and other states, including India—had established deeply concerning relationships with Canadian lawmakers.

NSICOP warned that Parliamentarians across all parties are potential targets for interference by foreign states. The committee found that such operations may be overt or covert, and that members of both the House of Commons and the Senate are considered “high-value” targets. Foreign states, the report stated, “use traditional tradecraft to build relationships that can be used to influence, coerce or exploit.”

NSICOP concluded that during the period under review, Beijing “developed clandestine networks surrounding candidates and elected officials to gain undisclosed influence and leverage over nomination processes, elections, parliamentary business and government decision-making.”

Records indicate that the Parliamentarian in question has maintained longstanding ties to several diaspora organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party—including the Jiangsu Commerce Council of Canada, a business group based in Markham linked to Beijing’s United Front Work Department, and now tied to a controversial meeting with Prime Minister Mark Carney during his leadership campaign in January.

Specifically on Chinese interference, NSICOP’s explosive report stated: “The United Front Work Department… has established community organizations to facilitate influence operations against specific members of Parliament and infiltrated existing community associations to reorient them toward supporting CCP policies and narratives.”

In an interview with The Bureau, a sitting senator—who asked not to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter—was asked whether they believed NSICOP’s findings were valid and whether Chinese state actors had influenced the Senate.

“Without a doubt. Without a doubt,” the senator said. “I’ve seen it with my own eyes. Some speeches in the Senate of Canada—one would not be surprised if they had been written directly in the offices of the United Front in Beijing. Many of the senators, if you see the positions they articulate, the way they articulate and the way they vote, speaks volumes about who they stand with. But the one thing about being a public office holder—at some point in time, you’ve got to stand on your feet.”

Those observations are echoed by findings in the NSICOP report, which states: “Foreign states developed clandestine networks surrounding candidates and elected officials to gain undisclosed influence.”

The report also found that “some Parliamentarians are either semi-witting or witting participants in the efforts of foreign states to interfere in Canadian politics… including providing privileged information to foreign intelligence officers.”

However, Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, in a contrary conclusion issued through her federal inquiry, assessed that “no evidence” had been presented of intentional wrongdoing by Parliamentarians implicated in CSIS foreign interference investigations. Instead, she concluded that some officials may have made “bad decisions.”

Still, specifics of the investigation into the Parliamentarian strongly resemble the broader findings of NSICOP—particularly if the allegation of providing inappropriate access to Canada’s Senate facilities to a Chinese national is substantiated.

In interviews conducted between 2022 and 2025, The Bureau’s sources—who requested anonymity due to fears of professional retribution—said they believe Canada’s national security agencies were inhibited from pursuing broader investigations into Parliamentarians and politicians across all levels of government. They described how CSIS agents’ efforts to advance foreign interference cases were at times delayed or obstructed by senior managers reluctant to scrutinize powerful political figures.

More broadly, the sources asserted that CSIS remains structurally constrained from effectively investigating senior officials and Parliamentarians. As a result, they warned, investigations into those broadly referenced in the 2024 NSICOP Special Report on Foreign Interference have not—and likely could not—produce meaningful deterrence against ongoing threats from China and other hostile foreign states.

The Bureau’s review of open-source records shows that the Parliamentarian at the center of the Senate allegations has, from the 2019 CSIS investigation to the present, maintained significant ties to multiple Canadian organizations linked to the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department.

These include the Confederation of Toronto Chinese Canadian Organizations, the Jiangsu Commerce Council of Canada, and a third British Columbia–based entity, which has documented connections to both the United Front and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—an entity the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has identified as Beijing’s central united front body.

The matter has gained urgency in the context of Canada’s ongoing federal election, in which Mark Carney’s party has come under scrutiny following The Globe and Mail’s revelation of his campaign’s January 2025 meeting with JCCC leadership—a meeting Carney’s team later denied. Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre has also faced criticism over his 2022 leadership race, which, according to documents and interviews reviewed by The Bureau, was allegedly targeted by both Chinese foreign interference networks and individuals aligned with the Indian government.

As previously reported by The Bureau, during the pandemic, several Liberal Party officials were involved in a PPE shipment initiative coordinated with the JCCC and authorities tied to the Chinese Communist Party. Official CCP correspondence praised the JCCC’s donations to China, and the group's response acknowledged its operations were “organized under the guidance” of the United Front Work Department and other Party-aligned bodies. One co-signer of that letter was a senior Liberal organizer who had also served as JCCC president.