EXCLUSIVE: Alleged Chinese Spy in New York Government Faces CBP Evidence on “Bringing In Aliens” as Trial Launches Today

BROOKLYN — As the high-impact Chinese espionage case against senior New York government aide Linda Sun opens Wednesday morning in federal court, prosecutors are hoping to introduce U.S. Customs and Border Protection records and call a U.S. State Department witness to support some of their most serious charges: that Sun helped criminally facilitate the U.S. entry of a Chinese government delegation — allegedly composed of covert agents — using forged state documents and falsified visa applications.

It is a case with massive geopolitical consequences. Wednesday’s trial launch marks the culmination of a sweeping federal probe that The Bureau has investigated for more than a year — a case intertwining foreign interference, elite political access, and high-end financial laundering allegedly orchestrated by Linda Sun and her husband, Chris Hu.

In essence, a review of the U.S. government’s thousands of pages of filings suggests that Sun leveraged her high office to illegally smuggle Chinese officials from Henan Province into the United States as part of a complex financial operation, working in tandem with Chinese community leaders in New York — also from Henan — within a broader Chinese state influence effort.

Federal agents allege the couple ran a laundering hub from Levine Wine & Spirits, a luxury storefront in Flushing, New York. Through shell companies and underground Chinese banking networks, Sun and Hu allegedly funneled more than $8 million in kickbacks into high-end real estate in Manhattan and Hawaii, a Ferrari Roma, and a TD Bank deposit box containing $130,000 in cash.

The couple is also accused of working for a network of Chinese Communist Party agents — including diaspora-based United Front operatives and political section staff at the Chinese Consulate — to push Beijing’s messaging into Governor Kathy Hochul’s administration and to block Taiwanese diplomatic access in New York.

Prosecutors further allege that Sun and Hu profited from the COVID-19 pandemic by steering millions of dollars in New York State contracts to Chinese PPE suppliers in exchange for secret kickbacks laundered through underground Chinese financial channels.

Court filings say Sun operated under the direction of figures known to the grand jury as CC-1 and CC-2 — described as leaders of U.S.-based Chinese associations tied to the United Front Work Department, the Chinese Communist Party’s principal overseas influence agency.

In their detailed motion filed Monday, federal prosecutors outlined their intent to enter key CBP records as evidence of how four Henan Province delegates allegedly entered the U.S. under fraudulent diplomatic cover — an official invitation letter bearing the name of a senior New York State politician, drafted by Sun herself, and misrepresented to the State Department as legitimate.

These four individuals, prosecutors assert, entered the United States at Dulles International Airport on October 29, 2019, traveled onward to Uruguay via Miami, re-entered through JFK Airport from Buenos Aires, and departed for Beijing the next day. The government’s motion argues that CBP’s internal travel logs “consummate the crimes” charged in Counts Four through Seven of “illegally bringing in aliens,” by proving the success of the visa-fraud conspiracy.

The new filings reviewed by The Bureau offer an unprecedented window into what U.S. prosecutors allege: that Linda Sun acted as a covert operative for the Chinese state, while Hu — with the help of United Front community leaders in New York City — built a multimillion-dollar seafood-export empire to launder their illicit gains into real estate in Hawaii, Manhasset, and Manhattan, lavish Peking-duck dinners for Sun’s parents, luxury vehicles, and even a stay in the same Beijing hotel suite once used by First Lady Michelle Obama, funneling proceeds through U.S. financial institutions.

In a separate filing this morning, Hu’s legal team sought to negate the evidentiary power of a government-prepared chart labeled GX-901, which visually depicts how over $4 million flowed from accounts in China linked to Hu’s uncle into Hu’s U.S. businesses.

As Hu’s attorney explained, “The government contends that ‘[i]n return for defendant Linda Sun’s political activities on behalf of Henan Province, CC-1 and CC-2 rewarded her by aiding the defendant Chris Hu’s PRC-based commercial activities,’ and that these business dealings ‘generated millions in the PRC,’ which were used to purchase real estate and automobiles in the U.S.”

But Hu’s motion counters that assertion: “There is no evidence that these payments are connected to any of the crimes charged in the indictment. Mr. Hu’s uncle, Chen Xiaoshi, is not alleged to have any connection to the PRC government,” his counsel argued. The money, they maintain, was either tied to legitimate seafood sales or part of a transnational family benefit — none of which was linked to political favors.

In detail, the chart shows approximately $1.44 million flowing into Hu’s company, Foodie Fisherman LLC, and another $2.28 million into a separate U.S. firm. Government filings assert that the seafood business operated as a laundering front.

But defense attorney Nicole Boeckmann dismissed the chart as “highly misleading” and “inflammatory,” arguing it has no proven link to any criminal conduct. “There is no evidence that these payments are connected to any of the crimes charged in the indictment,” the defense wrote, emphasizing that Hu’s uncle — Chen Xiaoshi — was a wealthy businessman who owns a large seafood company in Guangzhou.

Mr. Chen’s company, Yitong Industrial & Trading Co., Ltd., is based in Guangdong Province and, among other things, distributes seafood, she said. Foodie Fisherman, Hu’s U.S. firm, sold lobster directly to Yitong — and Boeckmann noted that the government’s own evidentiary disclosures affirm that basic fact.

“There is nothing to suggest that the lobster shipments to Yitong were the result of any assistance provided to Mr. Hu by the PRC,” Boeckmann wrote.

The defense also assailed the geographic logic of the alleged scheme. Federal prosecutors have suggested that United Front-linked figures — CC-1 and CC-2 — provided material help to Hu in China, such as lobbying for frozen seafood import licenses in cities like Zhengzhou in Henan Province and parts of Shandong Province. But Boeckmann pointed out that Hu’s actual seafood transactions — including the sales shown in GX-901 — were with a company in Guangzhou, located 1,500 kilometers from Zhengzhou and even further from Shandong.

“To claim this is part of a political kickback scheme,” she argued, “is tantamount to alleging a corrupt seafood deal arranged by a local politician in Saint Paul, Minnesota — and then proving it by citing lobster sales to a restaurant in New York City.”

“There simply is no evidence,” the filing concluded, “that Foodie Fisherman ever shipped seafood or any other product to Zhengzhou and Shandong, where the PRC supposedly assisted nonexistent business activities.”

Sun’s attorney, Jarrod Schaeffer, also pushed back on the government’s attempt to introduce the CBP border-entry and exit records. In a counter-filing, Schaeffer contended that the CBP entries were effectively “self-validating law-enforcement evidence” and should not be admitted without cross-examination, warning that their use would violate Sun’s Sixth Amendment right.

The broader allegations against Sun are anchored in her ties to figures long monitored by U.S. intelligence for their alleged United Front roles. CC-1 is identified as a PRC national turned naturalized U.S. citizen who led a Henan Province association in New York. That group is registered as a non-profit and has documented affiliations with the UFWD. CC-2 is described as a U.S. green-card holder with business interests in Shandong and leadership roles across multiple Chinese-diaspora associations.

Court records further allege that four high-ranking officials from China’s New York consulate — including two from the Political Section — were aware of or actively participated in the broader scheme.

If the jury accepts the government’s case, the verdict could reshape legal understandings of how soft-power interference and financial laundering operate in tandem within elite U.S. institutions. But if the defense persuades the court that the transactions were legitimate, the chart speculative, and the handlers unproven, the case could mark a limit in prosecuting foreign interference without the sharper tools of espionage statutes.