TAIPEI — China’s campaign to weaken Taiwan’s democracy reaches deeply into Indigenous communities, combining political funding, influence networks and an expanding flood of online disinformation, former government spokesperson Kolas Yotaka told a group of Canadian independent journalists.
Speaking at a Radio Taiwan International briefing, Kolas described a struggle that extends beyond military threats into elections and the long-term cultivation and funding of targeted politicians.
“Our country has been pushed into a new war state,” she said.
“It’s infiltrating media and news here in Taiwan and it has formally made media infiltration part of warfare. That’s what we are facing right now.”
Kolas, a Taiwanese researcher and security consultant who served as presidential spokesperson under Tsai Ing-wen, argued that Beijing’s objective is to undermine Taiwan’s legitimacy and deepen divisions that can be exploited politically. She pointed to a recent prosecution involving an Indigenous legislator as an example of how Chinese funding can allegedly be used to build political influence through communities.
On November 6, Taiwan’s High Prosecutors Office indicted independent legislator Kao Chin Su-mei and three associates on national security and corruption charges. Prosecutors alleged that the network received more than NT$170 million—approximately US$5.2 million—in Chinese funding between 2005 and 2016 to develop organizations and carry out activities on Beijing’s behalf. They sought a 14-year prison sentence for the lawmaker.
Kao Chin has denied wrongdoing.
According to prosecutors, the operation combined donations for infrastructure in Indigenous communities with political organizing and trips to China for united-front activities. Prosecutors also alleged that Kao Chin acted at Beijing’s direction on legislative matters, including opposition to arms purchases and interventions over historical narratives and education policy.
For Kolas, the significance of the case lies in the connection between money, political organization and identity.
She said initiatives presented as advancing Indigenous interests could instead be used to cultivate pro-Beijing groups and politicians, win votes and promote a Chinese national identity that serves Beijing’s claims over Taiwan.
In her account, the battle over historical narratives is part of the same campaign as efforts to influence legislative decisions. Political influence cultivated within communities can eventually be brought into parliament, where it affects debates over defense, sovereignty and Taiwan’s relationship with China.
Asked by The Bureau whether Beijing might exploit historical injustices or Indigenous land-jurisdiction disputes in Canada and other countries, Kolas drew a distinction.
She did not identify an equivalent Indigenous-focused nationalist campaign in Canada. Instead, she pointed to the cultivation of politicians who need financial support as a broader method of interference.
“They have been buying politicians, or especially politicians who need funding to run,” she said, describing what she believed was also occurring in Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Beijing, she argued, seeks relationships across party lines that could influence a country’s political direction over time.
“They are trying to buy different politicians that are pro-China,” she said. “They can make a difference at some point in the future.”
Her account comes as Taiwanese security agencies warn that Beijing’s interference is becoming more targeted ahead of the November 28 local elections. National Security Bureau Director-General Tsai Ming-yen said on October 22 that authorities were investigating suspected illicit funding for candidates and political groups, discounted flights for selected Taiwanese voters living in China, and inexpensive sightseeing trips that could constitute voter bribery. Other suspected tactics included illegal betting operations and hacking to obtain election-related intelligence.
In a November 12 analysis published by Taiwan News, retired U.S. Air Force officer Guermantes Lailari described a broader strategy connecting the CCP’s United Front Work Department and Taiwan Affairs Office with political, economic and cultural influence campaigns. He argued that Beijing seeks to bypass elected institutions and cultivate influence through businesses, community organizations, religious exchanges and subsidized visits to China.
Lailari described these efforts as working alongside psychological, legal and public-opinion warfare: promoting narratives that weaken confidence in Taiwan’s sovereignty, portraying democratic government as unstable and spreading defeatism through media networks and online content farms. His analysis places community-level political cultivation within a wider campaign to weaken Taiwan’s capacity to resist Beijing.
Alongside political financing, Kolas described an information campaign spreading through Facebook, Threads and other platforms, often packaged as entertaining memes or material designed to provoke anger.
The aim, she said, is to undermine confidence in Taiwan’s sovereignty while encouraging social divisions that create opportunities for interference.
Kolas also warned that artificial intelligence was accelerating the disinformation threat. Recent National Security Bureau figures show the scale of the increase: approximately 2.5 million China-linked disputed information items were tracked between January and September 2026, compared with about 1.69 million during the same period in 2025—an increase of roughly 48 per cent.
Kolas argued that Taiwan must treat its ability to explain these threats internationally as part of national security. The danger, she said, includes both people who fail to recognize influence operations and those who recognize them but see a domestic political advantage in their effects.
Disclosure: Journalist Terence Shen organized this trip for Canadian journalists, with businessman Robert Tsao contributing to its costs. Tsao is an outspoken critic of Beijing’s interference in Taiwan. The Bureau retains full editorial independence over its reporting.




Sounds very familiar to what is happening in Canada. Yet Carney is off to make China our new best friend. He is dangerous to us all and if Canadian's do not wake up there will be little left of Canada to defend. It gets more like Brookfield every day. PS maybe we all need to buy stocks in Brookfield on mass, so we can at least have a say.
Wow this describes Canada in a nutshell! I’ve never understood why our governments haven’t banned United Front in Canada, they easily put sanctions on Israel, Russia etc….. but can’t stop United Front from manipulating our citizens, politicians and indigenous communities. You can’t help but think our government is compromised.